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NOTES

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NORTH DAKOTA

I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this note is to examine the Public Trust Doctrine's
history, application and substance, with primary emphasis on North
Dakota law. The Public Trust Doctrine is basically a common law
concept1 that allows the public, as beneficiaries, to protect its interests 2 when the state exceeds restrictions imposed upon it by a trusteeship of property dedicated to the benefit of the public.3 The Public Trust Doctrine achieves this result by providing the general public access to the courts when a concerned member of the public feels
the state has exceeded its authority by allocation of a trust resource
in an incorrect manner.'
The State of North Dakota owns the waters 5 and the congressional section lines6 of the state in trust for the benefit of the public.
These rights can be allocated by the legislature or administrative
agencies but "only after an analysis of present supply and future
need" has occurred. 7 Future disputes involving the Public Trust
Doctrine may arise in several contexts. The needed water for energy
developments and for domestic usage9 created by population impacts associated with energy development will undoubtedly cause litigation involving the trust doctrine. 10 The increased burden on transportation facilities" and the association of the trust with the section
1. Olson, The Public Trust Doctrine: Procedural and Substantive Limitations on the
Governmental Reallocation of Natural Resources. 2 DET. C. L. REV. 161, 162 (1975).
2. Id. at 168.
S. Id.
4. Id.
5. United Plainsmen v. N.D. State Water Cons. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 4,57 (N.D. 1976).
6. Wenberg v. Gibbs Twp., 31 N.D. 46, 153 N.W.. 440 (1915).
7. 247 N.W.2d at 462.
8. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, COAL

IN OUR ENERGY FUTURE (1976).
9. Id.
10. See N.D. OP. ATT'y GEN. 142 (Sept. 7, 1976), In which a coal gasification company
had requested

a

zoning change

to close

a

section "line in

their

plant

area which would

have required members of the public wishing to use the road an extra two miles of travel.
This Is only one example of possible conflicts that will arise.
11. Id.
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lines" of the state will cause conflicts when extractive industries and
public transportation compete for identical resources. This note will
discuss a few of these problem areas.
The purposes of this note will be accomplished as follows. First,
the historical development of the Public Trust Doctrine will be analyzed. Second, there will be a brief analysis of the history of the
Public Trust Doctrine as applied in other jurisdictions. Third, relevant constitutional and statutory provisions will be considered. Fourth,
an analysis of North Dakota law will trace the history and application of the Public Trust Doctrine in this state. North Dakota law represents the largest portion of this note and is concerned with congressional section line easements and the water resources held in
trust for the public by the State of North Dakota. Finally, the note
will discuss a few of the many conflicts which may develop in the
area of extractive industry development in North Dakota.
II. HISTORICAL ASPECTS

A. ROMAN LAW
The Roman Law had developed a system of property classification which incorporated the terms res publicae and res communes
to differentiate between two different but related property terms."s
The distinction between the two is often blurred, 1 but the more
modern definitions"5 of the terms will facilitate an understanding of
the Public Trust Doctrine.
Res publicae refers to something which is capable of being
owned by a person but is owned by the state in the manner in which
a private individual would own it.16 An example would be a building or other property which remains freely transferable, but because
it is owned by the state is held out for common usage by all." The
Public Trust Doctrine does not attach to property truly res publicae
because the government owns it as a corporate entity.""
Res communes refers to things which are owned by all. 19 It is a
term which has traditionally been applied to such things which
by their very nature are incapable of being possessed or appropriated
exclusively by any individual. 20 This classification encompasses such
12.

Id.

13.
14.

C. NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY. 1SO (1936).
Trelease, Government Owncrship and Trusteeship of

Water, CAL.

L.

Rav. 638,

642

(1957).
15.

C.

NOYES,

supra

note 13.

16.

Trelease, supra note 14, at 640..

17.

C. NOYES, supra note 13. See Trelease, supra note 14, where the author gives as an

example a

capitol

building.

18. Trelease, supra note 14, at 640.
19. Id.
20. An excellent discussion of the concept appears
519, 525 (1896). involving the hunting of wild animals.

in

Geer

v.

Connecticut,

161

U S.
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things as air, light, water, the seas and seashores.2 1 When a state
owns a resource impressed with a trust for the use of all, the Public
Trust Doctrine attaches and the state has active duties to assure
22
that the trust is not violated.
The distinction between res publicae and res communes is often
blurred 23 but it appears that the words themselves are not so impor24
tant as the results which can be achieved by an application of them.
25
The two terms are only occasionally seen in American cases, but
seem to be favorites of commentators. 26 They will be used in this
note to differentiate between the ownership concepts which they connote.
B.

THE EARLY COMMON LAW

The Public Trust Doctrine is not founded on the statutes or Constitution of the United States or of the various states, but rather is a
common law concept incorporated in the laws of this country before
the Revolutionary War. 27 The initial development of the doctrine
grew out of a dispute between Parliament and the crown over the
power of the crown to freely alienate valuable tidelands and rivers
without restrictions. 28 The Magna Carta had promised the removal
of nets from the rivers to allow fish to pass upstream and the courts
soon construed this to include the right of passage of vessels which
traveled on the rivers and streams. 9 Two separate ownership concepts evolved and the streams were considered to be in two parts:
(1) the land underlying the stream; and (2) the servitude in the public which included the right to fish and travel upon the streams.3 0
The crown could alienate the property underlying the stream but
could never grant exclusive usage of the rights in the stream nor
could it grant any interest which did not account for the public's
The human race having multiplied, men partitioned among themselves the
earth and the greater part of those things which were on Its surface. That
which fell to each one among them commenced to belong to him in private
ownership, and this process is the origin of the right of property. Some
things, however, did not enter into this division, and remain therefore to
this day in the condition of the ancient and negative community.
Referring to those things which remain common, or in what he [Pothier]
qualified as the negative community, this great writer says: "These things
are those which the jurisconsults called res communes . . . the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea and its shores ....
As regards wild
sntmals . . . they have remained in the ancient state of negative community."
21. Id.
22. Olson, supra note 1, at 168.
23. Trelease, supra note 14.
24. Ross, Tu-tu, 70 HARV. L. REv. 812 (1957).
25. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896).
26. See C. NOYES, supra note 13; Lostiy, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water, 1 RocKy MT. L. REv. 161 (1929) ; POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TOPHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 199 (1922) ; Trelease, supra note 14.
27. Nedtwlg v. Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 208 N.W. 51 (1926).
28. I. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 36, 166 (1904).
29. Id. §§ 167-168.
30. Id.
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rights.-1 When this country obtained independence the common law
Public Trust Doctrine was adopted to define the -states' rights and
32
duties over navigable waters.
C.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES

1. In General
When the Constitution was written the title to land underlying
navigable streams was not reserved to the United States but was
passed to the individual states. 33 The states which have been admitted to the Union since that time have the same rights under the equal
footing concept.34 Early case law in this country recognized the
viability of the Public Trust Doctrine, 35 but Illnois Central Railway
Company v. Illinois6 is cited more often than any other case because of the immense impropriety of the grant involved. The United
States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railway Company upheld a
legislative revocation of a legislative grant, in fee, of a mile long
portion of the Chicago harbor, a navigable lake bed. Regardless of
the legislative motive which prompted the revocation, the Court considered the nature of the grant, not the value of the property, controlling in its disposition of the case. The Court determined that a
state legislature does not have the power to relinquish complete control over a navigable lake bed, a property which is held in trust for
the public. At the very, least, the state must exercise control over
the private use of the property to insure that the public use is not
unduly restricted. 7 The leading author on the modern Public Trust
Doctrine, Joseph Sax, has summed up the holding of that case as
follows:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the
free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that res'ource to more restricted
uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private
parties.3 8
The various states have developed different approaches to the
Public Trust Doctrine, most being similar to the holding in Illnois
31.

Id.

32. Nedtwig v. W.rallace. 2.7 Mich. 14, 208 N.W. 51 (1926).
33. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
34. Id.
35. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876): PollarlD's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (145i) : Mnrtin v. XVaddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
36. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
37. Id. at 451.
38. Sax, The Public Trv. t D-trilie
in Natural Rcsource Law: Effective Judici-al Intervention, 68 MiCH. L. REv. 471, 490 (1970).
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Central Railroad Company. Massachusetts' view i that a change in
the use of public lands is impermissible without a clear showing of
legislative approval.3 9 Even a clear showing of legislative approval
is not enough in Wisconsin, however, if the alienation appears to be
solely for the benefit of private parties. 40 California courts have consistently decided that any conveyance that can empower private parties to limit or change public uses is violative of the trust.4 1 There
does not appear to be any clear majority rule in application of the
Public Trust Doctrine. Some state courts do not recognize the doctrine even though, its major premise only requires that the govern42
ment be held accountable for the management of res communes.
2. Resources Attached With the Public Trust
Historically, the public trust has attached to such resources as
tidelands, lands beneath lakes, land beneath a state's navigable waters, water in whatever form, and parkiands. 43 Purposes protected
by the Public Trust Doctrine include navigation, fishing, and hunting. 44 North Dakota has developed a trust concept in relation to an
easement held for the public in the congressional section lines of the
state for transportation purposes.' 5 North Dakota is not alone in ap4
plying the trust to these easements.
Water appears to be the resource most affected by Public Trust
Doctrine. The idea of the navigable stream beds being held in trust
is consonant with the public's right to travel upon the waters. Riparian landowners and appropriators do not own the ,streams from
which they receive their water but merely have a usufructuary
right.47 The state may regulate this usufructuary right pursuant to
4
its police power. "
Western states have developed some unique concepts of water
use because of the dry climate prevailing throughout the West, which
demands wise water management policies. 49 In Arizona, 50 California,"' Colorado, 52 Kansas, 53 Nebraska, 54 New Mexico, 55 Oregon, 56
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

44.
45.
46.

Olson, supra note 1, at 179.
Wenberg v. Gibbs Twp., 31 N.D. 46, 153 N.W. 440, (1915),.
See Lawrence v. Ewert, 21 S.D. 580, 114 N.W. 709 (1908).

at
at
at
at
at

502.
516.
527.
551-53.
556.

47. Beck & Hart, The Nature and Extent of Rights in Water in
N.D. L. REv. 249, 252, 264 (1974).
48. Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
49.
50.

Trelease, supra note 14, at 641.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-101 (1956).

51.
52.

CAL. CONST. art. XTV, § 1: CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

53.

KAN. STAT. § 82a-702 (1977).

54.
55.

NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 5; NE.
N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.

Rev. STAT. § 46-202 (1948).

North Dakota, 51
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South Dakota5 7 Utah58 and Washington5 9 the waters are dedicated
to the use of the public or title is declared vested in the public pursuant to constitutional or statutory declaration. Water in these states
is res communes. In Idaho,60 North Dakota,, 1 Texas 62 and Wyoming63 the waters of the state are declared to be the property of the
state itself, not the public, and hence are res publicae. In Montana
the courts, in construing a weak constitutional provision, have stated
that the state took title to rivers and streams, with restrictions, upon
statehood. 64 As was, stated previously the distinctions between the
provisions declaring res communes and res publicae have been blurred in the cases construing the state's trusteeship or ownership of
water.6 5 The results achieved in the cases do not depend upon the
term ised, and the Public 'i-ust Doctrine appears to apply regardless
of whether water is classified as res communes or res publicae. Constitutional provisions and statutes are actually unnecessary for the
public trust to attach, but merely reiterate the basic premises of the
common law Public Trust Doctrine.
It is clear that the public trust is closely intertwined with the police power of the state to pass reasonable regulations for permissible
purposes in furtherance of the state's duties as trustee for the public.
Permit systems for allocation of water have been justified on this
basis. 66
3. Substantive and Procedural Aspects of the Public Trust
Doctrine
There are both substantive and procedural limitations upon the
state in regard to the Public Trust Doctrine. 7 Perhaps the most
important factor affecting the Public Trust Doctrine is the procedural
6
concept of standing.
Standing is a concept developed by the common law courts to restrict access to the courts to those persons with claims substantial
enough to warrant the allocation of judicial resources to resolution
of the problem or reparation of the injuries alleged. 69 The proponent
56. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.110 (1977)..
57. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-3 (1967).
58. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (1953).
59. JWASH. REV. CODE ANN. ! 90.03.010 (1962).
60. IDAHO CODE § 42-101 (1948).
61. N.D. CONST. § 210.
62. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.021 (Vernon 1972).
63. WYo. CONST. art. 8 § 1.
64. Smith v. Denniff, 23 Mont. 65, 57 P. 557 (1899), rev'd on rehearing, 24 Mont..20,
60 P. 398 (1900).
65. Trelease, supra note 14.
66.
W"'yoming Herefor1 Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925).
67. Olson, sulpra note 1, at 169-77.
68
United Plainsmen v. N.D. State Water Cons. Cnmm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976)
i. an exollent exam-'le of concerned citizens' ability to gain standing to challenge the
acts of zov-,',mental officials.
69. 1'ros.er, Priv'ate Actdon for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rv.
997, 1007 (1966).
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of a lawsuit needed to show that his injury from a particular act was
somehow unique as opposed to the public's injury. 70 When he had done
so the person's right to litigate was recognized and he gained stand71
ing in the court to have his grievance aired.
The Public Trust Doctrine provides members of the public with
standing to seek judicial relief when a resource engrained with the
public interest is alienated without due regard for the rights of the
public and to have that resource properly protected from arbitrary
governmental decisions. 72 The impropriety can take any one of four
forms: (1) administrative (e.g., an improperly issued water permit); (2) legislative (e.g.. a grant of trust property); (3) private
(e.g., interference with a section line easement); or (4) a combination of the first three. The courts will provide for a final objective
view of the disposition which has aggrieved the citizens to the point
of seeking redress in the courts, and the requirement of showing a
7 3
unique individual harm is dispensed with.
Joseph Sax states that the Public Trust Doctrine is a most useful environmental tool because it meets three necessary criteria:
(1) it contains some concept of a legal right in the general public;
(2) it is enforceable against the government; and (3) it is capable of
an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns for environmental quality. 74 This avoids the reoccurring problem of standing
faced by many environmental groups in trying to enjoin or abate potentially harmful governmental conduct. 5 In addition to giving standing to the public at large, the Public Trust Doctrine also brings into
play the constitutional guarantees 'of due process, which require notice, a form of hearing, and adequate standards and criteria in the
statutes or rules which attempt a reallocation of the resources held
78
in trust.
The substantive limitations on the state appear to be two-fold.
First, the state may not reallocate a trust resource if the effect would
be to restrict the nature or types of uses which benefited the public
prior to reallocation.7 Second, the government may not subordinate
public rights or uses for private purposes and private profits. 78
Whether a particular reallocation exceeds these limitations depends
on the facts of the case and the jurisdiction in which it is attempted.7 9
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Olson, supra note 1, at 168.
73. Sax, supra note 38, at 490.
74. Id. at 474.
75. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
76. Olson, supra note 1, at 171.
77. Id. at 176.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NORTH DAKOTA
Case law in North Dakota concerning the public trust is almost
exclusively in relation to public highways and the vast majority of
these cases are concerned with section line highways. Water law in
North Dakota has slowly evolved since statehood but only recently
has the supreme court of this state elaborated on government trusteeship of water.
A.

THE HIGHWAY TRUST

1. Origins of the Trust
The United States Congress in 1866 declared that all portions of
the vast public domain, excluding those areas reserved for other uses,
were granted for the construction of highways. 0 This grant was in
the nature of an offer and only became effective upon some affirmative act of acceptance.8 ' In 1871 Dakota Territory accepted this grant
as trustee for the public by declaring all congressional section lines
to be public highways as far as practicable.12 The section line easements were set at a width of thirty-three feet on each side of the section lines. All previously used highways were recognized after North
Dakota became a state in 1889.83
The lapse of time between the 1866 Congressional grant and the
1871 territorial acceptance caused conflicts which were resolved by
a judicially developed relation back doctrine. In 1897, in the case of
Walcott Township v. Skauge.14 involving a township's attempt to abate
a nuisance in the form of a fence across a publicly used highway not
following a section line, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
the territorial legislature's acceptance related back to the date of the
congressional grant.8 5
The landowner in Walcott asserted more than one defense and the
supreme court covered all issues that had been raised. The landowner
SO.
Act
f Tuly 2;, 18(6, (h. 262, § S, 14 Stnt. 25:1 (cOdified
pealed 1976)).
St. Stre-ter v. Stalnaker, 61 Neb. 205, S5 N.W. 47 (1901).
S2. LAWS oF TERRITORY OF DlAKOTA ch. 33 (1S71) (amended
RMv. CODES Ch. 29, § 1 (1877)).

The statute exempted certain portions
northeast corner of North Dakota. The portion
River, south of Pembina. Fort Pombina and
unorserved public domainl, being the first area

at 4,

U.S.C.

§ 932

(re-

and codified In DAKOTA

of Pembina County, now located in the
exempted was a plat lying along the Red
some adjacent land was not part of the
of the t-rritory settled by white fur trap-

pers and military personnel.

S3. LA.WS OF TERmTORY OF DmtOTA, ch. CXII, cl. IT, §.,R1-3 (1883). The first mention
of the s-',tw, line hict'ay, af' , ' statehod is N.D. POT.. CODE, ch. 17, art. 1,
1050,
10-1

84.
85.
37 of
Later

(1'91) : (

p-11ealedby 1697 ND.

qess. Laws, ch. 112).

6 N.D. 382, 71
Id. at 288, 71
the Po. ConE
cases decided

N.WV. 544 (1M97).
N.W. at 51. The court considered the enactment of C.L. 29, 8 29,
OF DAKOTA TiqtaTORY (1877) to be the effective date of the acceptanee.
in this state coneertina section line easements iave considered the
acceptance. effective upon passage of ch 3. LAWS OF TFRRITORY OF DAKOTA (1871).
sc
Wenberg v. Gibbs Twvp., 31 ND. 46, 153 N..

440 (1915).
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asserted that since the land was not severed from the public domain
until 1878, when a patent was issued, a prescriptive easement could
not have ripened prior to that date.80 The court answered this argument by stating that the congressional highway grant was in praesenti. 17 When the territorial legislature accepted the grant it related
back to the original date of the congressional grant in 1866.88 The
grant, once accepted, vested in the public a right to use the highways
that were established prior to the severance of the land they were
located on from the public domain. s The highway in question had
been used prior to the territorial acceptance and the settlement by
the homesteader to whom the patent was issued. 0 The court in Walcott also discussed prescriptive easements and it is unclear what
doctrine was actually dispositive of the issues raised. Regardless of
the final holding it is clear that the case could have been easily resolved had the court recognized that roads did not have to be formally
established by governmental action under the congressional grant but
could have been established validly by use or custom of the community. 91 It may be that whatever was said in Walcott about prescriptive
easements or the relation back doctrine was pure dictum.
The court in Walcott did not consider a landowner capable of
diminishing or impairing the public's use of property once vested in
them by common usage as a public highway. Thus, Walcott's real
importance is that the courts would protect highways established by
private acts in the same manner that the courts protected the section
line easements created by legislative action. The landowner took his
patent subject to the easements granted by Congress and accepted
by legislative and public acts.
The first case in North Dakota to announce the public Trust Doctrine in connection with the rights of way granted by Congress was
Wenberg v. Gibbs Township.9 2 The township had improved a highway
on a section line, taking four acres of land in the process. 93 The case
involved conflicts between the rights of a railroad, the landowner and
Indian tribes because of uncertainty in whom ownership was vested
94
from 1866 to 1874.
The plaintiff in Wenberg contended the government had no right
86. 6 N.D. at 287, 71 N.N.V. at 545-46. This argument was based on the principle that
time could not run against the king.
S7. Id. at 3S8, 71 N.WNV.at 546.
S8. Id.
89. Id.
9A. 1M. at 3S5, 71 N.W . at 544.
91. LTeach V. Mianirt, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652 (1938); Montgomery V. Somers, 50
Or. 2-9. 9 P. 674 (1.07).
92. 21 N.D. 1C, 153 N.V. 440 (1915).
93. Id. Th
four ac's
are exactly equal to the amount of land encompassed by tihe
section line
on th,- one mile long strip of land the plaintiff landowner owned.
o'acei-n
91. Id.
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to burden the railroad's grant with a right of way in the public,9 5 an
argument also raised previously in Walcott. 6 The court held that the
grant to the railroad, in 1864,"7 was an inchoate right and that title
did not attach until the certificate of definite location was filed in
1873. 9-1 Therefore, Congress was free to burden this land with an easement in 1866 and the legislature was free to accept it in 1871. 91
The most important aspect of Wenberg was declared on petition
for rehearing of the case. The issue of a legislative policy of compensating landowners for diminution in value of the section line so used
was raised. 100 The court said it believed the legislature had no power
to alienate property it held in trust or to pay compensation for land
not actually taken. 10 1 Had the court allowed compensation it would
have been a windfall to the landowner on whose tract the highway
was constructed since the land was burdened with an easement when
10 he purchased it.
The case of a landowner who took title subsequent to the opening
of an Indian reservation in 1904 on which roads had been established
prior to the reservation's creation, in 1874, was heard in Faxon v.
Lallie Civil Township.' 0 3 The court found no language in any statute
retracting the easement.'
The court stated that even if such an interpretation were reached the subsequent reopening would again
vest title in the public as would a railroad grant if it were abandoned.' 0 , In addition, the grant of highways was not a mere license
and could not be revoked once vested in the public. 10 6 The importance
of Faxon, then, is that the government itself could not divest the public of the use of the easement.
The court heard many cases involving primarily these identical issues in the earlier years.0 " These early cases consistently adopted
the relation back doctrine to the acceptance of the congressional highway grant by the territorial legislature. The holdings were consonant
in their treatment of time conflicts and provided a stable basis for
later cases to rely upon. As early as 1921, Justice Robinson of the
North Dakota Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
95.
96.
97.
JulyN
98.

99.

Id.
6 N.D. at 390, 71 N.W. at 547.
31 N.D. at 51, 153 N.W. at 441.
2,1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365.
31 N.D. at 51, 153 N.W. at 441.
Ir7. at 52. 153 N.W. at 441-42.

101.

Id. at 52, 153 N.W. at 442.

102. Id.
103. .6
N.D. 614, 1.63 N.W.
the history of 'o-th Dakota.
105.
106.
1n7.
Nat'l
Twp.,

the railroad was

made by Act of

Id. at 51-52. 153 N.W. at 441.

io.

104.

The grant to

1.

531

(1917).

The

case contains

an

excellent discussion

of

at 637-70. 163 N.W. at 533-34.

Id.
Id.
See Kritzberger v. Traill County, 62 N.D.. 208, 242 N.W. 913 (1932): Hillsboro
Bank v. Ackerman, 48 N.D. 1179, 189 N.W. 657 (1922) ; Ekwortzell v. Blue Grass
28 N.D. 20, 147 N.W. 726 (1914).
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public highway trust concept was so well settled in North Dakota that
there was no reason to even discuss it in disposing of a case involving
a landowner's appeal from the county supervisor's decision to open a
section line highway on his land. 10 8
2. The Nature of the Highway Trust
The state has certain rights and obligations as trustee of the highways. The trust property is subject to the police power of the state. 10 9
The state may control access to the highways but must pay compensation when an individual's access is impaired by improvements to the
highway. 11° The state must provide adequate drainage of water from
surrounding land when improvements are made. 1 '
Landowners, too, have certain defined rights and duties. Landowners have consistently been held to have i etaincd the fee to land on
which the easement is located. 12 When the easement is gained by
prescription the fee also remains in the adjacent landowner. 13 A prescriptive right will not ripen when gates exist at both ends of a welltraveled trail, the use being only permissive in nature. 11 4 Travel by a
tenant is also permissive and fails to establish a road by prescription." 5 The fee owner can use the land -on which an easement is located so long as his use thereof does not interfere with the public's
easement overlying the land. 116 The landowner does have a duty to
keep the highways clear of obstructions due to the use of adjacent
land." 7 The landowner can enjoin the hunting of wild animals from
the highway even though the state, and not the landowner, regulates
hunting of wild game. 1 The landowner is entitled to relief when waters impounded by a highway flood his land, 1 9 but not when such
flooding is due to natural causes and the engineering practices used
by the state are reasonable and non-negligent. 20
The public's rights and duties are not as explicitly defined as are
108. Huffman v. Bd. of Supervisors, West Bay Twp., Benson County, 47 N.D. 217, 182
N.W. 459 (1921).
109. Timm v. State, 110 N.VV.2d 359 (N.D. 1961).
110. Chandler v. .Hjelle, 126 N.V.2d 141 (N.D. 1964) ; Little v. Burleigh County, 82
N.WV.2d 603 (N.D. 1957) : Cummings v. City of 'Minot, 67 N.D. 214, 271 N.WV. 421 (1937)
Kin~g v. Stark County, 67 N.D. 260, 271 N.WV. 771 (1937).
l11.
Lamndowners received relief from flooding by mandamus in Iynstad v. Clemetson,
1 1 N.W.2d
-559 (ND. 1965), and by injunction in Viestenz v. Arthur Twp., 78 N.D. 1029,
54 N.W.2d 572 (1952)
(the landowN ntr received compliance with that injunction fourteen
years aftr.r the initial flooding, in Viestnz x. Arthur Tvp., 129 N. W.2d 31, (N.D, 1164)
112.
inot Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hjelle, 2:11 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1975).
113. Ca:Fey v. Corwin, 71 N.INT.2d 553 (N.D. 1955).
114. Berger v. Borger, 88 N.WV.2d 98 (N.D. 1958).
115. Troutman v. Ahlert, 147 N.W.2:1 407 (N.D. 1966).
11.6. mj,.llp v. J. C. Snyder & Sons, 113 N.WV.2d 625 (N.D. 1965).
117. Bergley v. 'Mann's, 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959); Rozell v. Northern Pac. By. Co,
39 N.D. 475, 167 N.W. 4S9 (1918).
118. Rutten v. \Wod, 79 N.D. 436, 57 N. W.2d 112 (1953).
119. Rynestad v. Clementson, 133 N.IV.2d 559 (N.D. 1965).
120. Frank v. County of Mtercer, 116 N. W.2d 439 (N.D. 1971); Lempr V. Knble, 86
N.W.2d 44 (N.D. 1057) : Carroll v. R"
Twp., 13 N D. 458, 101 N.W. 894 (1904).
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those of the landowners. The public's easement is for transportation
purposes and does not carry with it the right to hunt wild animals
from a highway.122 The public's use of the easement is subject to restrictions placed on it by the police powers of the state.1 22 The public
is also generally liable in tort for obstructing the easement.1 23
With the various rights and duties in the public, the
landowner
and the state, conflicts are bound to arise when the various interests
are competing for the right of use of the section line easement. Two
recent cases, Small v. Burleigh County1 24 and Saetz v. Heiser,1 25 have
illustrated how resolution of these problems is achieved when the
competing interests are not in agreement as to permissible uses of
the easement.
Small presented the North Dakota Supreme Court with the issue
of whether a court could require the removal of fences on a section
line when the board of county supervisors would not order their abatement and refused to open a section line to public travel.1 26 The district court upheld the commissioner's actions, holding that although
section line highways are established without action by the county
supervisors, formal action is needed for opening them to public travel.12 7 On appeal, the majority of the supreme court summarily reviewed the case law and statutes applied to section lines in deciding
the following issue: "[T]here is no clear-cut decision by this Court
on the question necessarily involved here-whether a section line is
open for travel without action by a township or county board, or
whether such action is required in order to open a section for travel." S The majority agreed with opinions of the North Dakota Attorney General1 29 and case law in South Dakota130 concerning the same
point and held that the public could not be deprived of its rights to
access over a section line because of a statute which seemed to permit fencing.1 3 The majority concluded that congressional section
121. Rutten v. Wood, 79 N.D. 436, 57 N.W.2d 112 (1953).
12. Timm v. State, 110 N.V1.2d 359 (N.D. 1961).
123. Solberg v. Schlosser, 20 N.D. 307, 127 N.W. 91 (1910); Pewonka v. Stewart, 11
N.D. 117, 99 N.W. 1080 (1904): Kuhnert v. Angell, 8 N.D. 198, 77 NW. 1015 (1898).
124. 225 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1975).
125. 240 N.NV.2d 67 (N.D. 1976).
126. Small v. Burleigh County, 225 N.A.2d 295, 296 (N.D. 1975).
127. Id.
128. Id.
(emphasis added). Case law has traditionally held that no formal proceedings
are necessary to establish a highway on a section line. See, e.g., Lalim v. Williams County,
105 N.W.2d 339, 243 (N.D. 1960) ; Huffman v. Bd. of Supervisors, West Bay Twp., Benson County, 47 N.D. 217, 1S2 N.,V, 459, 461 (1921). Small needed access across the fenced
portion of the section line to farm 2,500 acres of land. Small had no alternative access

to the farmland, though this hitter falct wIS unnecessary for the decision.

129. The opinion construed the following sentence from the 1955 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
1S1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-06-28 (1961))
(amended Supp. 1977); "The pro-

visions of this section shall not prohibit contructiin of fences along or across section
lines not open for travel..
Se N.D. Op. Arr'y GEN. 156 (1963). See also N.D. Op.
ATT'Y GEN. 160 (1933).
130. Lawrence v. Ewert. 21 S.D. 580, 114 N.IV. 7019 (1908).
131. N.D. CENT. ConE 9
[1-06-28 (1960) (amended Supp. 1977), provides as follows:
_No pern
shn!l place or ,ause to ie p:ice I any permanent obstruction or
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lines outside the limits of an incorporated city, unless closed by proceedings permitted by statute, are open without any necessity of formal openings.1 3 2 The fence was ordered removed.
Justice Johnson issued a strong dissent in-Small. 13 He felt that
there was a distinction between a grant and the formality of opening
a section line for travel, largely due to the economic burden of upkeep
placed on the governmental unit. Justice Johnson stated as follows:
"This trust is not merely passive but gives the trustee possession,
control and supervision of the trust property. . . . The right-of-way
easement is subject to the governmental authority of the state, under
its police power, to establish, open, construct, maintain, abandon, or
close public highways.' 34 The dissent concluded that any highway
not established by prescription or declared open would not be available as such for public use. 13 5
The majority opinion in Small followed a strict application of a
trusteeship of the easement. The majority's result is well reasoned,
particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiff had sought a much
needed order from the county commissioners. Under the minority
opinion he would have been unable to obtain such an order because
of the commissioners' prior refusal. The dissent in Small was based
largely on economic considerations and a fear that the government
would be burdened by excessive costs of constructing and maintaining
roads on section lines throughout the state. In practice many of these
section lines are used as roads and have never been improved since
the land was settled. Many township boards would be shocked to learn
that all section lines now in common use in the township must be
graded and improved. Such is not the custom in this state.
A balancing test was applied in Saetz to interpret the state statute' 36 that was considered in the Small decision. The statute provided
that fencing would be allowed to obstruct the section line if the board
of county commissioners determined that travel on the section line
was impractible and the board granted permission to the landowner.
In Saetz a farmer brought suit against the owners of a gate which

132.
133.
134.
1.5.

stones or rubbish within thirty-three feet of any section line, unless he first
shall secure permission in writing from the board of county commissioners
or the board of township supervisors, as the case may be. Snch permission
shall be granted only where the topography of tie land along such section
line is such that in the opinion of the hoard of coun.ty commissioners or
hoard of township supervisors, as the ease may be, the construction of a
road on the section Iine is
ticahle.
1
The provisions of this section
shall not prohibit construction of fences along or across section lines not
open for travel but such fences shall be subject to removal as provided in
section 24-()6-30.
225 N..r.2d at 200.
Id.
Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
Id. at 204.

136.

240 N.W.2d at 71. Later amendments to the statute provided

that certain fences

would not be considered constructions of the section line if gateways
were erected at points of interspetion between the fences and section lines.

or

cattleguards
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crossed a section line. The county commissioners who stopped maintaining the road on the section line refused to allow the farmer to
use it or maintain it. The district court found for the county commissioners and the fence owner because access to the road was provided
to the farmer by gates in the fence. The district court concluded that
the gates provided a reasonable restriction on access under the police
power of the state."37
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Saetz decided that the legislature was aware of the Small decision and the trust imposed on it
when it amended the applicable statute."' The court agreed with the
county commissioners that a balancing test was appropriate. 9 A
balancing in such a situation meant that in keeping the trust intact
a cattle guard and a gate must be provided at every point a fence
intersects a section line. This allows free movement of vehicles and
40
permits cattle to pass through the adjacent gateway.
The court in Saetz, while applying a balancing test, was very careful to assure that the public trust was protected. In both cases, Small
and Saetz, the court expressed a willingness to require removal of
an objectionable obstruction to assure that the public's use and enjoyment was not restricted when the legislature and the landowner
were aligned in competition with the public's use. The decisions indicate that any citizen may require abatement of an interference with
the public use even when a governmental body elected by the citizens indicates its willingness to allow the impairment. It is important
to note that in the Saetz case the burden of any costs incurred to restore the public use was placed on the landowner causing restriction
of the public access. The burden placed on the public, crossing a
cattle guard every mile, is minimal compared to the expense of installing such a device.
3. Extraction of Minerals from Beneath Section Lines
The distinction between the state's ownership and trusteeship of
property was the basis for the decision in Minot Sand and Gravel
Company v. Hjelle,141 where the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a landowner must be compensated when the highway commission condemned land adjacent to the section line easement and took
a fee interest in the condemned land, thereby depriving the landowner of access to the aggregate underlying the section line easement. 142 The state contended that only the land adjacent to the section
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
231 N. W.2d 716 (N.D.
Id. at 722.

1975).
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line was being condemned and that compensation would be paid accordingly.14 3 The gravel company alleged that compensation was due
for 403,000 tons of gravel underlying the gravel company's portion
1
of the traveled section line easement. "
Considering damages to the plaintiff's fee, the court said as follows: "[Tihe state, by taking the abutting and adjacent land, may
have deprived the owner of many, if not all, benefits and uses of the
property in the section line easement, particularly as to the aggregate lying beneath the section line easement.' ' 145 Thus, the landowner
could be compensated for the aggregate underlying the section line
14 6
easement.
The court was careful to guard the public trust by noting that the
easement on the section line was entitled to subjacent support.147 The
landowner could be compensated for the aggregate only if he could
remove it at a profit without interrupting the public's easement. 4 8
Minot Sand and Gravel has broad implications for landowners and
extractive industries that operate in the state of North Dakota. Minot
Sand and Gravel implies that the subjacent and lateral support of the
public easement cannot be disturbed. Most of the coal in North Dakota
is-near the surface and mining it without disturbing the support of the
overlying land presents quite a problem for a coal miner who might
contemplate it.
The potential for conflict is evident when one considers that
slightly less than sixteen acres of every 640 acres in North Dakota
that may be leased for coal extraction is potentially unavailable for
the use the lease covers."" It is estimated there are seventeen billion
tons of mineable coal in the state. 5 ° Assuming that coal is as likely
to be found beneath section lines as not, it follows that the amount of
coal underlying section lines in North Dakota is approximately 425
million tons. 151 This does not even consider the value of other minerals
underlying the easement that are presently uneconomical to remove
because of the public's right to subjacent and lateral support. When
one considers the additional easements that have been acquired to
improve and widen roads, the figure cannot help but increase. It is
143.

Id.

144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 722-23.

147.

Id.

14S. Id.
149. This figure is arrivod at hy my own calculations. There are 640 acres of land In
a square mnile of lnnd (1760 yards on each sitle). A strip of land one mile long by 11
yards wide equals four acres (64f acros/1760 yards reduceod to its lowest common denominator eqials 4 acres/11 yards). Cnnsiderina all four sides of the square the acreage
of all four"sides is 16 acres less some small amount for overlap.
150.

OFFICE OF PUnIc

AFFAIRS, .111110

note S.

151. Seventeen billion multiplied by one-fortieth yields 425 million
16/640 equals 17 hillion x 1/40 equals 425 million).

tons.

(17

billion x
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after a consideration of these facts that the impact of the Public Trust
Doctrine becomes clear.
The section line in Minot Sand and Gravel was one on which a
road in common usage existed. 152 In some areas in the western part
of the state, where coal extraction is expected to occur in the near
future, some section lines are all but abandoned or completely unused
by regular travel. A difficult decision may present itself if a section
line not in common usage is mined and an unused section line is excavated. Does Minot Sand and Gravel suggest that no mining of any
section lines will be allowed? Certainly the value of otherwise economically mineable coal under a portion of land not presently in regular usage as a highway exceeds the monetary value of the unused
easement. If a balancing of competing interests is applied, as in
Saetz, how does one balance the value of a possible future use against
profitable mining? Possible contingencies will also be difficult to attach values to.
The Public Trust Doctrine does not prohibit a change in the use
of a resource.' 5 3 The Doctrine only demands that the new use be consistent with or enhance previous and traditional uses 'of that trust
property. 5 4 Whether a new use (strip-mining) would be a use which
would impair a non-existent use as a highway would be debatable. At
least two alternatives are available to a court: (1) to determine on
a case by case basis whether a particular use is being impaired; or
(2) to consider the type 'of disposition and develop a fixed standard,
i.e., that any disposition which could possibly disrupt the easement
violates the trust. The water law cases seem to rely on the type of
grant involved rather a case by case basis. 5 5 The fixed standard approach would have the advantage of being definite. A case by case
approach would allow a policy of defining competing interests and
making decisions based on economic realities. The easement is one
for travel and if precautions were taken to replace a section line to
its original condition it could allow removal of coal which otherwise
would never be recovered under a strict ban on mining.
Depending on the approach a court develops in answer to the
problem of whether unused section lines may be mined, a more difficult issue could manifest itself when a little used road is underlain
with a good vein of coal. I-low does one attach a value to the infrequent use? If no mining is allowed 'of section lines when unused, the
answer is easy. A prohibition against any mining means the values
need not be weighed. If a court decides mining on an unused easement does not disturb the trust, how then will the court weigh the
152.

231 N.W .'-'d at 719.

1 33.
154.
155.

Sax, spira note 3S, at 486.
Olson, supra note 1, at 176.
Sax, supra note 38, at 527.
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value of one use per year, one use per month, or one use per day?
The adjudication of cases under a balancing of interests approach
may lead to complicated factual determinations at the trial court
level to determine the best use.
It must be noted that the Public Trust Doctrine does not prohibit
a disposition if proper supervision is maintained to ensure that the
public interest is not impaired.256 If it impairs the public use it will
be cause for strict judicial scrutiny and quite possibly may lead to an
invalidation of the governmental grant of the trust property. 5 7 Due
to the standing concept inherently available in the doctrine, it would
be possible for any member of the public to bring suit to enjoin any
possible interference with the public's vested interest in the easement
property. 58 It does seem clear that the actual injury to the subjacent
or lateral support of the easement would qualify for an injunction or
whatever appropriate relief would be needed to abate the interference59, The Public Trust Doctrine has broad implications indeed
for the extractive industries of this state.
B.

WATER LAW

1. Background
Prior to discussing the public trusteeship of water in North Dakota a historical perspective will be helpful. A complete, detailed
analysis of the history of water law developments in North Dakota
is beyond the scope of this note and would be redundant, considering
the quality and extent to which that subject is covered elsewhere.16 0
North Dakota has gone the full circle from riparian, to appropriation, to a permit system in regulating the usufructuary rights in water. 1 When North Dakota became a state,1 6 2 section 210 of the state's
constitution was adopted.' 3 It read as follows: "All flowing streams
and natural water courses shall forever remain the property of the
state for mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes.' ' 164 An in156. Id. at 486.
157. Id. at 490.
158. Olson, supra note 1, at 168.
159. See Small v. Burleigh County, 225 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1975), in which the court
ordered abatement of interference with section lines.
160. Beck & Hart, The Nature and Extent of Rights in Water in North Dakota, 51
N.D. L. REV. 249 (1974).

161. In 1R66, the doctrine of absolute ownership of subterranean percolating waters
and diffused surface waters along with usufructory riparian rights in other streams and
navigable waters was codified in TimR. DAK. CiV. CODE § 256. In 1881, LAWS OF TERRITORY OF DAKOTA, ch. 142, § 1 granted landowners appropriate rights. In 1889 the North
Dakota Constitution was adopted, more specifivally § 210. Filing of rights was establishe:| in 1S99. 1S99 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 173. In 1905 appropriative rights were reinforced.
1905 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 34. The water rights have been continually molded until their
present codification. N.I). CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-01 to 61-04-31 (Stipp. 1977).
162. The Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 18S9 ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.
163. Enacted Oct. 1, 1889.
164. N.D. CON-ST. § 210: Beck & Hart, supra note 160 state that the prolvsion came from
the Desert Land Act of 1S77.
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terpretation of that provision suggests a concept of res publicae.'"
That is not quite the interpretation which the provision received in
1896 in Bigelow v. Draper'" however, when riparian rights were in
67
vogue in North Dakota.
Bigelow involved the plans of a railroad to condemn land and
water rights of landowners to divert the waters of the Heart River
from its channel to facilitate the maintenance of a safe roadbed for
the passage of trains. 16 This would have alleviated the necessity of
travel over unsafe trestles maintained at two river crossings. The
court in Bigelow adopted a very narrow reading of the state's ownership provided by section 210 of the North Dakota Constitution' 9 and
modified the language to provide for recognition of riparian rights
even though they did not consider whether any beneficial use was
being made of the usufructuary rights in question. The court decided
that riparian rights could not be taken without compensation even
though it never considered the extent to which such rights had vested.
The court did preserve some pretext of state control, however. In referring to section 210 in Bigelow the court said as follows:
On the other hand, we do not wish to be understood as expressing such a view as to its proper interpretation as would
utterly emasculate it. So far as it can have constitutional effect, it should be construed as placing the integrity of our
water courses beyond the control of individual owners.7 0
The extent of the state's participation in the management of the
water resources of North Dakota has grown since the movement
from riparian rights until the present day when- active allocation of
this resource is on a permit basis.' 7 There have been problems associated with this switchover but case law has resolved some of these.
It is clear that the state will honor constitutional guarantees by paying compensation when a taking of vested rights occurs. 72 This situation has to a large extent been avoided by recognition of prior vested
rights whenever a change resulting in increased state control has
73
occurred.
The state's right to administer water resources in this semi-arid
state was strengthened in Baeth v. Hoisveen.174 The court in Baeth
considered the nature of previously unused water rights, deciding that
such rights had not vested and were not private property. The land165.

Trelease, supra note 14, at 641-43.

166.
167.
168.

6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896).
Id.
Id.

169.

Id. at 162-63, 69 N.W.

170.
171.
172.
173.
1.74.

Id.
See supra note 161.
Volkmann v. City of Croshy, 120 N."'.2d IS (N.D. 1963).
Id.
157 N4,W.2d 728 (N.D. 196S).

at 573.
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owner therefore was not entitled to be compensated under the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment or under article I, section 14 of
the North Dakota Constitution.'" 5 The court declared the use of water
to be subject to the police power of the state in furtherance of the
public's ownership of water and of the need to preserve water due
17 6
to the state's climate.
The court in Baeth explained its previous decision in Bigelow as
follows:
Notwithstanding what this court said in Bigelow v. Draper....
and in subsequent supporting decisions which may be construed to the contrary to what is said in the instant case, we
hold that there is no deprivation of a constitutional right or
rights, and that the action taken by the legislature in enacting
rNorth Dakota Century Code section 61-01-01] is within the police power of
the State, as a reasonable regulation for the
public good.177
The statute referred to in Baeth, North Dakota Century Code section
61-01-01,178 is a declaration of res communes, that all the waters of
1 9
the state belong to the public. 7
2. United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission:18 o Its Meaning and Consequences
It is clear that once the barriers placed by Bigelow were removed
by the holding in Baeth, the scope of the state's trusteeship of water
was enlarged to a significant degree. After this was accomplished,
the stage was set for the application of the common law Public Trust
Doctrine in United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conserva175. Id.
176.

Id.

177.
178.

Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960) provides as follows:
All waters within the limits of the state from the following sources of water

at 733.

supply, namely:
1. Waters on the surface of the earth excluding diffused surface waters
but including surface waters whether flowing in well-defined channels or
flowing through lakes, ponds, or marshes which constitute integral parts
of a stream system, or waters in lakes; and
2. '"raters under the surface of the earth whether such waters flow In
defined subterranean channels Or are diffused percolating underground

waters; and
3. All residual waters resulting from beneficial use, and all waters artificially drained: and
4. All waters, excluding privately owned waters, in areas determined by
the state eng-ineer to be non-contributing drainage areas. A noncontributing drainage area is hereby defined to be any area which does not
contribute natural flowing surface water to a natural stream or water-

course

179.
IRO.

at an

average frequency oftener

than once In three years over

the latest thirty year period :
belong to the public and are subject to apnropriation for beneficial use and
the right to the use of these waters for such use, shall be acquired pursuant
to the provisions of chapter 61-04 (emphasis added)
Trelease, sifpra note 14, at 641-43.
217 N-W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
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tion Commission.'8'
The United Plainsmen Association is a North
corporation founded for the purposes of research,
dissemination of information regarding proposed
and to take necessary action to assure compliance

Dakota non-profit
compilation, and
coal development
with the laws for

the preservation of the state of North Dakota. 182 The United Plains-

men asked for a hearing for the production of evidence and an injunction prohibiting the issuance of water permits for energy related
usages in North Dakota. 8 3 The injunction would stay in force until
the state water engineer could show that a short and long term comprehensive water plan for the public's water had been adopted.

84

Allegations by the plaintiffs centered on irreparable injuries which
would result from the North Dakota Water Conservation Commission's issuance of water use permits for the massive coal and coal
related development planned for the southwestern part of the state.
Among the specific and potential injuries alleged were strip mining
of prime agricultural land, pollution of high-quality air, loss of wild
life habitats, and social disruptions of the communities affected. g8'
In affidavits submitted to support the allegations of the complaint,
individual members of the United Plainsmen complained that acquifers would be dried up or ruined by water table encroachments, that
fallout of seven trace elements"' in coal ash would ruin crop and animal production,' 18
18
and labor costs-.

7

and that taxes would increase as would machinery

One Gf the principal issues in the case was the applicability of
the Public Trust Doctrine to allocation of water in North Dakota. 8 9

The district court discussed the Public Trust Doctrine and the traditional dispositions to which it was applied, and held the Public Trust
Doctrine inapplicable in this situation. The court stated as follows:
Although this Court agrees with the concept and believes it to
be the law of the State of North Dakota, the cases cited generally related to a termination of certain public interests and
conversion to another use, as opposed to the use of a natural
resource as we have in this case. 19°
The district court opinion further stated it found no justiciable issue
181. Id.
182. Brief for Appellant at 1, United Plainsmen %. N.D. State Water Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).

183.

Id.

184.

Id.

185.

Id.

186. Brief for Appellant, app.
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).

at

24,

187.

Id.

188.
189.
190.

Id.
247 N.W.2d at 460.
United Plainsrnen v. N.D. State

Jan. 21, 1976).
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because of the inapplicability of the Public Trust Doctrine.9 '
The case, being tried with little or no precedent available in North
Dakota, presented a novel issue on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court; what application, if any, the Public Trust Doctrine had
19 2
in relation to planning and water permit grants by the state.
The supreme court, when it addressed the issue, said as follows:
"We agree with United Plainsmen that the discretionary authority of
state officials to allocate vital state resources is not without limit
but is circumscribed by what has been called the Public Trust Doc9 3

trine.'"2

A discussion of Illinois Central Railroad' 4 followed, after which
the court stated that it could not agree with the narrow application
of the Public Trust Doctrine ascribed to by the district court. 95 The
court held that the Public Trust Doctrine at a minimum requires
some determination of the potential effect of water allocation on the
present water supply and future needs of the state.1 96 It stated that
some short and long term planning must be done1 9 7 and concluded as
follows: "We believe that [section] 61-01-01, of the [North Dakota
Century Code] expresses the Public Trust Doctrine."' 19 8 The foregoing
required, in the supreme court's opinion, more than plenary dismissal.

9

P

The impact of the decision in United Plainsmen on coal development in this state remains to be seen. More than anything, the amount
of planning required of the state officials remains the cause for uncertainty as to any broad and sweeping assertion. The case was remanded for further proceedings, but before they were held, the suit
was dismissed by stipulation of the parties.2 0 0 The Public Trust Doctrine as adopted provides a tool for future litigants to challenge any
arbitrary action by state officials in their allocation function. The
level of planning that is necessary and what will constitute a detriment to public interest has yet to be quantified.
The court tended toward a balancing of interests, as applied in
Small,'" when it quoted from a Pennsylvania case20 2 advocating controlled development rather than no development.
We must recognize . . . that decision makers will be faced
191. Id.
192. 247 N.AV.2d at 460.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 460-61.
195. Id. at 462.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 463.
200. Letter from Jos. A. Vogel, Jr., to Don Negaard (June 30, 1977);
Honorable Benny A. Graff to Don Negaard (June 22, 1977).
201. 225 N.11'.2d 295 (N.D. 1975).
202. Payne v. K(assab, 11 Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 14, 312 A.2d 86, 93 (1973).

letter from the
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with the constant and difficult task of weighing conflicting
environmental and social concerns in arriving at a course of
action that will be expedient as well as reflective of the high
priority which constitutionally has been placed on the conservation of
our natural, scenic, esthetic and historical re20 3
sources.
If the Public Trust Doctrine develops along traditional lines, a
disposition would require that the use of the trust property either
improve or not substantially impair the public's rights vested in the
20 4
property.
In addition to substantive safeguards,2 0 5 the water code in North
Dakota has procedural safeguards 20 6 to provide for notice of hearings
open to the public. Since the Public Trust Doctrine applies, its procedural limitations must also be met even in the absence of a statute.20 7 The procedure of disposing of a trust resource must afford
notice, a form of hearing, and adequate standards and criteria in the
statutes or rules carrying out the objective.2 08 With the standing obstacle overcome in the Public Trust Doctrine's presence it is possible
for any citizen to challenge an application when these minimum safe20 9
guards have not been met.
3. Federal Law and the Public Trust Doctrine: a Possible
Area of Conflict
No attempt thus far has been made to discuss possible developments in the federal sector as they might relate to coal related impacts, particularly water usage, in North Dakota. These concepts
deserve mention, especially in light of the Carter administration's
recent hearings on water policy.2 10 Some -of the options being considered could have serious effects on the extent to which a state or
citizen of a state may participate in management of water re211
sources.
a. Reserved Water Rights of the United States
203. 247 N.W.2d at 462, 463.
204. Olson, supra note 1, at 167. Olson states there are four substantive limitations on
dispositions to which the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine applies :
1. that the disposition be for a valid and permissible "public purpose" within
the narrower context as that term is use.t in public'trust law ;
2. that the area, use and quality of tle resource made open to and used and
enjoyed by the public is not destroyed or substantially impaired :
3. tit
the government retain some control over the area, use or quality
of a resource to be affected by a disposition in order to ensure continued
protecton of tile public activities enjoyed therein
4. that the disposition does not subordinate the public right to the private
right for private purprses of profit.
Id.
205. Scc N.D. ("EXT. CODE ! 61-04-0f (Supp. 1977).
206. Id.
207. Olson, sup,-a note 1, at 169.
208. Id. at 171.
.
209. Id. at 16S
210. Sce 42 Fedl. Reg. 367,S (1977).
211.
Id.
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Whatever power the Desert Land Act 212 granted to the western
states with -subsequent reinforcement in cases such as California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 212 may in the future be subverted by the federal reserved rights doctrine as announced in Winters v. United States.2 14 That doctrine states that when
the federal government reserves land for certain purposes, a quantity of water located in that state is immediately reserved for the
purposes for which the reservation was established 2 15 Such reservations of water take priority, from the date of the establishment of
the federal reservation, over all state created rights perfected subsequent to establishment of the reservation. 216 The amount of water
deemed to be reserved depends upon the reasonable needs of the
1
land reserved.2 7
A concept such as this places immense planning burdens on states
when the states are unsure of the precise amount of water remaining
which is freely allocable.2 18 Many of the uncertainties which reservation by the federal government creates can be cleared up by an adjudication of rights under the McCarran Amendment 219 to determine
the exact extent of reserved rights on a given river system. The
McCarran Amendment provides that the United States consents to
be sued as a defendant in any suit for the adjudication of rights to
use water in any river system.2 2° The statute was itself passed in response to the uncertainty created by federal reserved rights and provides an excellent tool for resolving problems in this area.
The question then arises whether the Public Trust Doctrine requires the necessary planning to take into account water now owned
and reserved by the United States. If such extensive planning is required, it might well include the duty to ascertain the extent of federal
appropriations presently existing. This could be accomplished through
the use of a suit under the McCarran Amendment. Planning requirements might also necessitate allowances for contingencies arising
from future reservations by the federal government.
b. Federal Wetlands Easements
Certain federal ownership of property in the state that may cause
conflicts with private ownership and that may well accrue to the
benefit of environmental concerns are the wetland easements ac212. Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23 (1971)).
213. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
214. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Se F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
219. Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-495, 66 Stat. 560 (codified a.t 43 U.S.C.
666 (1971)).
220. Id.
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quired through the application of proceeds from the federal waterfowl stamps. The easement, granted to the government in perpetuity,
prohibits the destruction of these wetlands.2 21 If the easements are
strictly enforced it would mean no coal development would be allowed
on land burdened by them. To what extent easement violations will
be challenged, the revocability of these easements, and the extent of
acreage subject to the easements in the coal impact areas of the
state are questions which should be considered in the planning process
required by the Public Trust Doctrine.
In considering only two possible federal ownership conflicts, the
reserved rights doctrine and the wetland easements, it readily becomes apparent that the federal government may be very instrumental in shaping coal development policies in North Dakota. Because of the immense power which the United States possesses under
the Constitution, statutes, and spending powers, there is no doubt that
the potential for intervention, coupled with the resources to do so,
spells out a vast area of uncertainty regarding water development
policies. Such a factor cannot be overlooked when defining state water law concepts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The common law Public Trust Doctrine is not and should not be
a substitute for careful planning by legislative and administrative
officials charged with co'ordinating allocation and disposition of the
publicly owned resources of North Dakota. Beneficial industrial development planning requires a much higher degree of social responsibility than is presently required by the minimal safeguards provided by the Public Trust Doctrine.
What the Public Trust Doctrine does provide for the citizens of
North Dakota is a judicially developed safeguard with procedural
and substantive limitations applied to dispositions of resources which
are allocated by the public to the private sector. The Public Trust
Doctrine accomplishes this by providing standing in the courts for
concerned citizens who wish to challenge an allocation of resources
that they feel is not in the public interest. The Public Trust Doctrine
serves the interests of the public when a governmetnal body which
is required to represent the public ignores or reacts arbitrarily with
regard to the terms of the trusteeship with which the public has been
vested with property rights. As a short term concept it can and will
provide a minimum standard for review of governmental action but
is no substitute for careful, detailed planning and mandatory legislative guidelines for wise energy related development.
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